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Abstract 
 
This study approaches the fundamental aspects of the ongoing debate around 
the transforming context of telecommunications sector and regulation in 
Brazil. It departs from the recognition of losing essentiality of fixed-line 
telephony and the risks of maintaining this service under public regime and 
how it may jeopardize the prospects of telecommunications development under 
severe investment constraint and current political and economic 
circumstances. The objective is to offer an overview of the sector performance 
and to ponder about some references that granted policy makers and the 
board of commissioners of the regulatory agency to advocate toward the 
establishment of a new regulatory framework for the sector. 
  
Keywords: Telecommunications in Brazil; Concession model; De-regulation; 
Public Regime; Competition. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The Brazilian telecommunications market has dramatically transformed since 
its privatization in 1997. While by mid 1990s, the so called ‘General Directives 
for the Opening of Telecommunications Market’ (MINICOM, 1997) justified the 
choice of fixed-line telephony as universal service, today´s demand for 
telecommunications is driven by mobile and data communications 
technologies that in large extent perform as economic substitute for wireline 
based services. 
 
Historical documents that contributed to conceptually justified the urgency 
and limits of sector reform played essential role in constituting new paradigms 
for the sector. Those technical and legal studies comprised virtually all aspects 
from valuation of the state owned companies to long term demand forecasting 
(MINICOM, 1995a, 1995b; 1997).  
 
Remarkable references include the available data for voice telephony services. 
Available records for earlier 1990s indicate that average telephony density in 
Brazil was of 8.4 accesses per 100 habitants with much smaller margins for 
underdeveloped regions of the north and northeast regions (MINICON, 1997).  
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These and other references lead to elect the universalization of the fixed-line 
services as the fundamental policy objective of the sector for the following 25 
years. It also defined several initiatives set to create favorable environment for 
investment leverage with particular importance assigned to defining a price 
cap regime for tariffs that was framed to cover investment and operational 
costs while assuring market level return on investments.  
 
To secure the updating of the universalization policy the regulatory agency 
defined a general universalization plan (PGMU) which targets were set to be 
renewed every 5 years. PGMU functions as an instrument to promote 
universalization of services under public regime and its renewal rule allows to 
periodically assessing the progress of the policy.  
 
The growth of the sector after the privatization reframed the 
telecommunications sector in Brazil. By 2010 the universalization was 
consolidated in a context of scaling down of fixed-line service importance 
facing the inexorable demand for broadband internet and the popularization of 
mobile telephony.  
 
This study attempts to summarize the transforming pattern of the sector and 
the recent trend toward the establishment of a new regulatory framework. 
Fundamentally it approaches the exhaustion of the current concession of 
fixed-line telephony services and why the maintenance of this model is 
deteriorating the sustainability of the concession and reducing competition. 
The consensual aspects of the regulatory reform are highlighted together with 
an exam of the current political and economic circumstances. 
 
2. Exhaustion of current concession model 
 
While the fixed-line services was the driver for policy formulation in the first 
half of the 1990s, the current demand for telecommunications services is 
mostly oriented to modern value added services developed to suit internet 
environment and desired request for mobility. References about the shifting 
service demand are scathing.  
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Figure 1: Subscribers of telecommunications sector in Brazil 
 
Notes: References are for December. 
Source: ANATEL, 2016 
 
Figure 1 contrasts the extraordinary performance of mobile services demand 
and stable fixed-line subscribers. Despite the patterns for services 
performance, available data addressing their financial outcome points out a 
vigorous decline on the average revenue per subscriber particularly to fixed-
line services (BoAML, 2016). 
 
A recent forecasting of the free cash flow to equity of the concessions states an 
unequivocal decline of the concession sustainability3 (MINICON-ANATEL, 
2016). Following figure outline the aggregated performance of the concessions. 
 
  
                                                          
3 Concept of sustainability is explored later in this section. 
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Figure 2: Forecasting concessions free cash flow to equity 
 
 
Source: MINICON-ANATEL (2016), with adaptations 
 
The free cash flow of equity is a measure of how much cash a company pays to 
equity shareholders after expenses, reinvestment and debt repayment. It 
contracts with the also declining forecasting of operational net result. 
According to the official forecasting by 2019 the net results of the aggregate of 
concessions in Brazil would run bellow its costs. Further references in the 
report also indicate the lowering of profit margins and increasing cost for 
investment. 
 
Among telecom services those provided upon mobile platforms have a 
particular importance to the sector. The regulatory agency recognizes that 
voice provision using radiofrequencies cover larger area and population than 
those based on wireline infrastructures. According to FREITAS (2016) mobile 
coverage reveal that above 80% of the Brazilian population is located in areas 
with mobile service availability. Following table offers a precise view of such 
information.  
 
Table 1: Mobile service coverage 
Coverage 
Domiciles Population Municipalities 
Quantity % Quantity % Quantity % 
 Below 30%  324.262 0,6% 1.306.646 0,7% 89 1,6% 
 30% a 50%  1.250.568 2,2% 4.941.935 2,6% 373 6,7% 
 50% a 75%  4.612.397 8,0% 17.197.066 9,0% 1.241 22,3% 
 75% a 85%  3.589.580 6,3% 12.567.291 6,6% 786 14,1% 
 85% a 95%  13.710.448 23,9% 44.387.407 23,3% 1.267 22,7% 
 95% a 99%  20.459.822 35,7% 66.547.226 34,9% 1.030 18,5% 
 100%  13.373.494 23,3% 43.808.228 23,0% 784 14,1% 
 Total  57.320.571 100% 190.755.799 100% 5.570 100% 
Fonte: ANATEL, 2016 
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The results confirm the importance of mobile services, offered exclusively 
under private regime, as the main channel of communication in Brazil. By 
recognizing this condition it makes sense to formulate arguments towards the 
analysis of service provision in a technology neutrality basis. Based on this 
understanding, data provided by the regulatory agency identified that all 
municipalities in the country are attended by at least one operator. Besides, 
around 60% of the population counts on at least 3 service providers resuming 
an extraordinary perspective of competition in a country with severe social and 
economic constraints and a continent size territory.  
 
 
Table 2: Competition the voice provision (2015) 
Voice Operators 
Municipalities Covered Population 
Quantity % Quantity % 
2 operators 1.674 30% 84.643.744 41% 
From 3 to 5 operators 2.866 51% 37.931.389 19% 
From 6 to 10 operators 904 16% 51.047.926 25% 
More than 10 operators 122 2% 30.787.464 15% 
Source: ANATEL, 2016 
 
 
Following this understanding, FREITAS (2016) arranged data for mobile 
service coverage over positioning records of available public telephone booth 
(TUP). In his attempt author identified that 79,41% of TUPs coexists with 
mobile services. Following map displays a visual outlook of the overlap 
between TUP and mobile coverage in the country. 
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Figure 3: Mobile coverage of Public Telephony Booth (TUP) in Brazil 
 
Source: ANATEL, 2016 
 
The darken areas correspond to those municipalities where mobile sign 
overlaps majority of available TUPs. By its turn, the light brown spots 
correspond to those areas where TUPs are not coexisting with mobile signal. 
Zooming in the evidences provided by FREITAS (2016) it is possible to identify 
the robustness of such approach. Following figure offers a visual perspective 
about the mobile coverage over the São Paulo Metropolitan Region.  
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Figure 4: Mobile coverage of the São Paulo Metropolitan Region 
 
Notes: It consider 2G, 3G and 4G coverage. 
Source: ANATEL, 2016 
 
 
Combined, these figures display a straightforward message that fixed-line and 
wireless solutions coexist in the same field of competition. This context has 
inspired several studies approaching the pattern of competition between these 
technologies. Remarkable conclusion already settled for mature countries is 
predominately for setting mobile service as an economic substitute of 
conventional fixed-line voice (GARBACZ and THOMPSON, 2007; 
BRIGLAUER et al, 2011; BARTH and HEIMESHOFF, 2012). 
  
Available studies addressing the Brazilian circumstances confirm the 
magnitude of market transformation and have systematically ratified the 
international trends. For example, LOBO (2011) identified for 2008 that 
income-elasticity of the fixed-line voice service was ten times higher than those 
for mobile telephony.  
 
Other references are equally sounding. A study by CANÊDO-PINHEIRO e LIMA 
(2009) about the wireline telephony demand in Brazil, based on observations 
for 2002 to 2004, reveals that a reduction in 50% of the subscription fee would 
lead to 3,3% increase in service demand.  
 
By its turn, SCHYMURA e CANÊDO-PINHEIRO (2006) concluded for the 
inefficiency of the PGMU obligations that were inconsistent with the 
population demand for telecommunications services and implied in a public 
policy with excessive cost and lower social benefit.  
 
A study by OLIVEIRA (2014) reinforces the consistence of the findings. Based 
on a broad national survey this author observed that 59,4% of the 
respondents stated that mobile telephony was used as substitute for wireline 
telephony. To 20,2% of the sample the reason why not to have fixed-line voice 
service due to its price, an evidence that was confirmed in other questions 
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raising the issue that fixed-line voice service is not price competitive.  
 
The perception of quality has also played its stake in the shifting pattern of 
consumer behavior. For instance, IPEA (2014) has figure out of survey studies 
that the perception by consumers about the quality of wireline and wireless 
telephony is closely equivalent. This finding challenges the conventional 
arguments that the perception of quality of wireline services is better than 
those of mobile.  
 
Recent data provided by the census bureau about consumers´ demand for 
telecommunications services pictures an accurate view of the current business 
environment. Following figure 4 indicates that the percentile of domiciles that 
use exclusively mobile phone as main communication gateway significantly 
increased over the last decade, passing, in 2009, those with wireline 
telephony. 
 
Figure 5: Historical performance of the domicile demand for fixed-line voice and 
wireless mobile services 
 
Fonte: PNAD-Census (IBGE, 2003-2014) 
 
 
The loss of attractiveness of fixed-line voice service occurs in opposition to the 
growth of data services demand. Such evidence poses a fundamental challenge 
over market forces, notably in the supply and demand for conventional 
telephony services. Following table offers an overview of income-demand 
relationship for wireline and wireless telephony. 
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Table 3: Telecommunications services demand by class of income 
Income All 
With Mobile 
and fixed-
line voice 
service 
Only with 
wireless 
service 
Only with 
fixed-line 
voice 
service 
Average Domicile Income  R$4.374,65 R$7.722,02 R$2.757,30 R$2.990,01 
Average per capita domicile 
income  
R$1.639,20 R$2.818,21 R$1.035,64 R$1.502,18 
Note: Based on a sample of 57.320.555 domiciles.  
Source: Census (IBGE, 2014) 
 
References reveal that lower income families prefer mobile services over fixed-
line solutions. Reasons for that might be summarized by decreasing mobile 
service prices, larger rates of service provision and service plans that suit to 
consumer’s demand. 
 
Sustained on this general collection of evidences one might conclude that the 
typical services provided by incumbents are under severe competition 
pressure. It might also explain, despite of the lack of specific studies on the 
issue, the lowering demand for TUP since user might be better served by 
cheaper and convenient mobile services. Another example of the cross effect of 
growing mobile offer is the successive failure of the regulator´s attempt to 
create a popular telephony plan with subsidized price (AICE). By December 
2014 the so called AICE subscribers had 159,3 thousand subscribers in a 
universe of 29,2 million eligible candidates (ANATEL, 2015a). 
 
Moreover, in a context of unprecedented technology transformation, new forms 
of communication play an essential role towards the shaping of consumer 
behavior. The diversification of the physical infrastructure and technology 
standards and the spread of processing capacity through autonomous devices 
and internet applications are other examples of the recent trends in the sector. 
Corroborates with this tendency the growing number of subscriptions for voice 
services and data offered upon hotspots wi-fi widely available in the major 
urban areas of the country what has also contributed to enhance the quality 
of access and the consumers´ cost reduction. 
 
This new business environment has contributed to promote the resetting of 
the voice market, with new business models and applications that essentially 
attends consumers’ request and cost structure.  
 
Evidences out of competition diagnosis and the paradigmatic transformation of 
the consumer behavior, that assign higher value to mobile 
telecommunications rather than wireline based communications. 
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2.1. Flaws of the public regime 
 
The privatization of the Brazilian telecommunications inaugurated the public 
regime of fixed-line service provision. It refers to a juridical framework that 
allowed government to franchise the supply of public services to former state-
owned companies, the concessionaries, subject to obligations of continuity, 
universalization and the compliance with predefined standards of quality of 
services (POSSAS et al., 1998).  
 
As result of the privatization it was defined five concessionaries operating over 
delimited regions, according to a General Plan of Concession Allocation (PGO). 
While a concessionary is a private company engaged in the 25 years contract 
with the state, the concession refers to the company´s business unity in 
charge of carry on the obligations of the public regime.  
 
The concessionaries were set to freely compete in the market with other 
companies operating under the regular private regime, the so called 
newcomers. To balance the field of competition these companies must observe 
specific regulations, including those addressing the conditions of network 
cession, respect to price cap tariffs, among other.  
 
While such condition allowed to effectively delivering the object of the 
concession during the first decade of the contract, the transforming business 
environment later evidenced that regulatory obligations would turn into an 
excessive burden to the concessionary. Furthermore, historical reliance of 
policy makers upon concessionaries´ network as platform for addressing the 
most diverse sort of public policies ultimately accelerated the exhaustion the 
model. 
 
Two concepts are fundamental to define the limits of the economic balance of 
the sector. First is what is conventionally called in Brazil the ‘financial and 
economic equilibrium of the contract’. It consists in a legal concept aligned to 
the legislation of administrative contract that set the preservation of the 
original conditions of the contract as a precondition to its economic 
equilibrium. Within this perspective, changes provoked by market trends 
would not justify the rupture of the contract.  
 
By the other hand the economic conditions of the concession is evaluated 
according to its sustainability. It is measured according to economic and 
financial parameters formulated out of market trends, costs and demand for 
the services, and the capacity of concessions to remunerate investments and 
assure returns above its costs. Following figure conciliates these concepts. 
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Figure 6: Concessionary and Concession 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: FREITAS, 2015 
 
 
This matrix of possibilities represents how concessionaries and concessions 
are related to each other. The regulatory authority is in charge of monitoring 
both the concessionary and concession in order to keep the track of their 
performance and assess the risks to the continuity of the public regime. 
 
Even though official reports addressing the financial and economic conditions 
of the contract and the sustainability of the concessions are most under 
confidential rule, available references allow inferring a prognostic about the 
current situation of concessions sustainability. The reference that definitely 
put the issue in the decision making agenda was released in June 2015 when 
the agency publicly disclosed the imminence sustainability risk of the 
concessions (FREITAS, 2015).  
 
Among the references the agency detailed the systematic revenue loss by 
concessions and the increasing marginal costs of the service pushed by costly 
universalization obligations and the maintenance of technology and assets for 
wireline telephony (FREITAS, 2015). 
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Table 4: Aggregated revenue of wireline service operators in Brazil. 
Revenue  
(R$ billion) 
2005 2010 2015 
Δ  
2005-2010 
Δ 
2010-2015 
Subscription fees R$11,02 R$10,51 R$ 9,63 -5% -8% 
Call fees R$23,35 R$21,04 R$12,90 -10% -39% 
Interconnection  R$  2,88 R$  2,18 R$  2,30 -24% 6% 
Infrastructure 
sharing  R$  1,46 R$  2,07 R$  3,26 42% 57% 
Total R$ 38,72 R$ 35,80 R$ 28,10 -8% -22% 
Source: FREITAS, 2015.  
 
Historical data for the sector confirms the deterioration of revenues by the 
sector. Between 2005 and 2010, the aggregated revenues of the sector 
decreased by 8%. And, in the following 5 years the revenue decreased by 
unprecedented 22%, led by 40% reduction of calls revenue what evidence the 
lowering use of voice service. While this reduction was partially compensated 
by increment in revenues of services as interconnection, the loss in the fixed-
line voice service revenue is wide larger than increment in other revenue 
sources.  
 
References of revenue and demand of conventional fixed-line services endorse 
the vigorous change in the behavior of consumers. By 2015 it was already 
recognizable that mobile telephony became an economic substitute of wireline 
based telephony. Hence, given the status of universalization of voice services it 
is reasonable to expect the gradual dissolution of the wireline concessions and 
the loss of essentiality of services object of the concession, raising the concern 
of changing the current concession contracts in order to avoid a systematic 
failure of the telecommunications system in the country. 
 
 
2.2. A glance on the reversible assets 
 
An emblematic example of the onus of public regime is the limited capacity 
assigned to concessionaries to dispose reversible assets. Few words on the 
concept of reversibility are worth it since it is a specific component of the 
Brazilian regulatory framework. 
 
Reversibility consists in an idiosyncrasy of the administrative law that assigns 
to the State the right to reclaim the property of concessions´ assets necessary 
to provide services under public regime. It was originally designed to be a 
mechanism to assure continuity of essential services during and after the 
concession contract term. Therefore, the concessionaries would have the right 
to explore the available networks, increase and modernize them in order to 
comply with universalization obligations and then return these infrastructures 
to the State after the concession completion. 
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Within the General Law of Telecommunications4 the definition of the limits of 
reversible assets is assigned to the regulatory authority. Therefore, in the 
attempt to establish the extent of reversible assets, regulators have engaged in 
a debate which parts are generally arranged in two opposite biases usually 
referred to as “patrimonialism bias” and “functionalism bias” (MARQUES 
NETO, 2004; DE FREITAS et al., 2016). Those affiliated to the patrimonialism 
approach defend that reversibility embodies all assets independently of the 
service essentiality.  
 
By its turn functionalists recognize that the value payed by investors at the 
privatizations auction assured the private property of these assets and the 
reversibility rule would only apply as a pledge to assure the continual 
provision of services under public regime as long as it was classified as 
essential. Once the service essentiality ceases companies would be allowed to 
freely place these assets to other purposes. 
  
As long as the deliberation about the limits of the reversibility keeps unsettled 
concessionaries are in charge of maintaining these assets by an increasing 
marginal cost (DE FREITAS et al., 2016). As a matter of fact the repercussion 
of reversibility has a non-trivial impact over the competition given the fact that 
it applies only to concessionaries. 
 
Other consequence of unfinished debate is the uncertainty about the extent of 
reversibility guideline over new investments in the sector. This concern is 
exacerbated by the odds of infrastructure convergence that allows companies 
to offer multi-services over a single technology platform. 
 
 
2.3. The maintenance of concession in monopolistic areas 
 
 
Although it looks reasonable to assume that the service provision has reached 
majority of population, it is fundamental recognizing the existence of several 
localities where service availability resumes to those provided by a single 
operator. Therefore, it is reasonable to set a regional approach of the 
deregulation in order to protect the right of communication of populations 
from rural and remote areas. 
 
Keeping the concession in these areas seems to be a reasonable approach 
towards a smooth transition process and to avert eventual juridical issues and 
other risks related to contextual aspects of the concession contract. To be 
consistent and legally consistent this proposal must be set on the premise of 
negotiable settlement and executory commitments between the concessionary 
and the State. 
 
                                                          
4 BRAZIL, 1995.General Law of Telecommunications (LGT).  
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3. Transition in a context of political and economic gloomy 
 
 
The magnitude of the transition in course requires a thorough adjustment of 
regulatory approach and a mid to long term review of legislation applied to the 
sector.  
 
Regarding the regulation, reducing the scope of current concessions implies 
reviewing the PGO, a reference attached to the concession contract, which is 
already set to be periodically reviewed according to certain parameters of 
competition. Reviewing the PGO is a matter of the executive, confirmed by 
presidential decree. 
 
By its turn, according to the sector legislation, determining the eligibility for 
essentiality of the telecommunications services is a prerogative of the national 
congress. It implies in recognizing the necessary congressional approval that 
would require a reform in the current general telecommunications law.  
 
Both initiatives are subject to the constraints of current environment for 
decision making in Brazil. Within this circumstance it is unpredictable how 
fast any agenda about leveraging investments and modernizing the 
telecommunications sector and regulation would potentially been belated. 
 
Meanwhile, sector crises imposes a exceptional sense of urgency and a positive 
agenda turned to effectively restore companies´ compromise to invest in the 
sector in order to assure the necessary modernization of the network and to 
adequate it to new demand standards. References provided by the BNDES 
(2015) demonstrate that required amount to assure the transition towards the 
new economy exceeds R$ 141 billion investment for the period from 2015 to 
2018. It represents 37,8% real growth over entire investment roll-out for the 
period from 2010 to 2013. 
 
 
3.1. From dissension to outbreak decision makers consensus 
 
The recognition that sector in general and the concessions in particular are 
facing an economic turbulence inaugurated a series of debate about the 
transition for a new regulatory approach and the resetting of the public 
policies. By February 2016 the Agency published a first technical analysis 
approaching the necessity for immediate change in the regulation framework 
(FREITAS, 2016). It was later reinforced by the considerations by LOUREIRO 
(2016) and finally the results of the joint report by MINICON-ANATEL (2016) 
the subject gained relevance and was definitely scaled up to gain the political 
agenda. 
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Leading conjectures about the reform of the concession obligations may be 
segmented in two main approaches. The simplest and now less probable is the 
maintenance of current concession as it is (ANATEL, 2013; LOUREIRO, 2016).  
 
The second proposal consists in reducing the scope of the public regime to 
areas where fixed-line voice services is the sole and last resort of 
communication (FREITAS, 2016). This proposal is consistent with the 
recognition of thorough competition and reducing relevance for services 
provided under public regime. By reducing the extent of the concession it 
implies resizing the attached regulatory obligations what would ultimately 
lightening the incidence of regulatory costs. 
 
The shifting position of the ministry of communications emerged shortly after 
the Agency positioned toward the proposal of a new perspective for the sector 
future. The so called ‘Joint report of the Work Group between the Ministry of 
Communications and the Anatel on the alternatives for the revision of the 
services and telecommunications model in Brazil’ (MINICON-ANATEL, 2016) 
came out with elements of the Agency proposal, and a straightforward 
proposal to lightening the touch over the obligations applied to the public 
regime. 
 
The summary of the main aspects addressed in the joint report was confirmed 
in the order n° 1.455/2016 (MINICOM, 2016) that establishes the guidelines 
for reviewing the concession model and to define a new policy for the sector.  
 
Other initiative with major repercussion to the sector development passes 
through reviewing the conditions for disburses of the Fund for the 
Universalization of Telecommunications Services (FUST)5. This fund was 
created in 2000 with the objective to finance expenses associated with 
universalization in areas where universalization costs would not be 
commercially viable. However, its use has been circumscribed to the 
universalization of fixed-line services what has virtually inhibited its use over 
the years. Initiatives to turn the use of FUST resources more flexibly and able 
to address the universalization of modern services are under debate at the 
national congress6.  
 
 
3.2. What is certain and uncertain about current Brazil´s political and 
economic crises? 
 
 
Since the turning of current presidential tenure the country has faced its 
worst economic recession in decades. A proof of that is the rapid declining of 
                                                          
5
 FUST is mainly funded by a 1% tax on the net operational revenue of the telecommunications companies 
(BRAZIL, 2000). 
6
 Project of Law n° 1481/2007: Altera a Lei nº 9.394, de 20 de dezembro de 1996, e a Lei nº 9.998, de 17 de 
agosto de 2000, para dispor sobre o acesso a redes digitais de informação em estabelecimentos de ensino. 
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investment rate and lowering returns (BoAML, 2016). By its turn consumers 
and industry confidence have systematically faded out given the increasing 
inflation and deteriorating credit policy (FGV, 2016).  
 
Despite the uncertainties concerning current political and economic 
circumstances there are havens of certainty in this framework. One that is 
particularly akin to the telecommunications reform is the stable mandate of 
agency commissioners that assure, among other prerogatives, the agency 
cohesion during the regulatory transition. An argument backing up the 
Agency´s commitment is the current effort towards the establishment of its 
strategic planning reflecting the legitimate wish to establish a solid foundation 
for proper development of modern regulatory approach (ANATEL, 2015b). 
 
Updates addressing the reform of economic and finances policies have also 
provided reliable signs towards a positive agenda for economic recovering. 
Besides, the perception of bad public governance, originated in the 
deterioration of ethical relations, conformity, transparency and accountability, 
are coexisting with an overall perception of relative debility of the State 
institutions. 
 
3.3. The Industry skepticism 
 
 
Facing the deterioration of the concessions, concessionaries engaged in several 
strategies to face the loss of competitiveness in the sector. Specifically they 
enhanced their portfolio of services and packed it up in combos that would 
ultimately compensate the decline of market share and increase demand for 
more value added mobile and broadband services.  
 
However, despite the marketing efforts the increasing marginal cost of carrying 
obligations of the contract still poses a particular challenge to the incumbents, 
especially in the highly competitive markets where cost cutting strategies rule. 
Therefore, it might be expected that industry would be willing to engage in 
initiatives toward the lightening of regulatory burden. 
 
Despite the willingness of concessionaries and regulator to promote a smooth 
transition towards a light touch model, uncertainties about this process 
remain critical. It mainly due to the unfinished debate concerning the 
transactional mechanism and schedule and the migration methodology that 
ultimately imply in exchanging a parcel of the onus of the remaining period of 
the concession contract into investment commitment. 
 
 
  
17 
 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
This study introduces an overview of the current trends in the 
telecommunications sector in Brazil and the proposal to deregulate fixed voice 
telephony. It approaches the recognition of weakening essentiality of fixed-line 
voice services facing the growth of new services and increasing marginal costs 
of the fixed networks due to loosing scale and excessive regulatory costs. 
 
Remarkable evidences of the sector development and the transformative 
pattern of technologies trend and consumers behavior are reported taking as 
references official reports published by the regulatory authority, ministry of 
communications and census office. Supporting evidences grounds the 
recognition of urgency towards the establishment of ‘lighter-touch’ regulatory 
systems. 
 
Challenges to address the deregulation of the sector are contextualized by 
unprecedented economic and political hurdles that impose particular threat to 
an agile decision making process. Within this context the transition set over a 
reduced scope of the current concession contracts is placed as a preferential 
alternative despite the ongoing debate. 
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